[An address delivered on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Calcutta Improvement Association.J The subject which I have selected for exposition is one of supreme interest, inasmuch as it concerns that which every reasoning being holds in highest estimation, and that which the best intellects which the world has produced have ever sought to investigate and study, namely, the human mind. The term Phrenology literally means the science of mind, or rather of " the mind," for it is important, as I shall presently endeavour to show, to hold a clear distinction between mind and " the mind". The term might be used to signify and embrace every description or department of knowledge which concerns the human mind, but it has been conventionally restricted to one doctrine or phase of mind-science, which I shall hold prominently in view on this occasion. The history of philosophy may broadly be considered to be a history of attempts to determine the nature and attributes of the human mind. Some philosophers have confined themselves to a study of the instrument by which knowledge is acquired and retained ; others have gone beyond this and sought to derive from a contemplation of the revelations of consciousness and reflection the laws not only of mental operations but of the universe; but whether they have limited their attention to the phenomena of the mind itself, or extended their view to existence at large, the most of them have relied exclusively upon the evidence supplied by consciousness both as regards the conditions under which knowledge is acquired and the general conclusions derived from that knowledge respecting the conditions under which things exist. This in fact has constituted a speciality of the science of mind. In other sciences observation is entirely objective ; we study objects and phenomena from without; we observe what the properties of things are, and how they vary under varying circumstances and conditions. We take a piec of metal for example, we note its shape, size, weight, colour, density, sonorousness, ductility, malleability, and so on ; we subject it to various influences, such as heat, electricity, chemical agents, 8zc., and notice what changes in its properties take place in consequence. The record of these observations and experiments constitutes science or knowledge as far as the particular metal is concerned. We extend our inquiries to other metals and note the result. By repetition of our investigations we arrive at uniformity and certainty of results, the conditions being the same. By comparison of these results we obtain laws and principles which govern and explain multitudes of phenomena relating to metals and the influences to which they are subjected. In all this, however, we are denied any knowledge of the change undergone by the substance in any other way than through the alterations in its properties which it manifests.
It is otherwise, however, with the science of the human mind. In it we possess the peculiar and valuable privilege of being ourselves the subjects of the phenomena which we study, of experiencing within ourselves a knowledge that these phenomena are taking place, of being able to define them, compare them, distinguish them, classify them, and describe them, so that we can tell others what we, the subjects of the phenomena, experience, and the experiences of one man can thus be compared with the experiences of others. This privilege has given mind science a different position to that of any other. In all other cases we contemplate objects and actions from without ; in this, we, the subjects, know what happens within us. This faculty or property or privilege is denominated self-consciousness. It is a power or faculty of singular value and importance in the study of mind science, but its very singularity has led to most unfortunate consequences. In the first place, men finding themselves in possession of so wonderful and efficient a means of be- The influence of his circumstances and surroundings can thus be studied just as if he were a metal; but this method has been curiously neglected?unaccountably and unfortunately neglected, as I shall show you. In the next place, by the subjective method the study of psychology has been necessarily limited to man, because we have no means of ascertaining positively that other animals or objects possess the sense of internal activity which we possess. By the objective method we can satisfy ourselves that beings lower in the order of creation manifest under certain circumstances actions resembling those which man manifests. An animal hurt utters a cry of distress, and though we cannot assert that he is conscious of pain, we can compare his conduct under the influence of violence with that of a man, and this method of observation and comparison we are capable of exercising as regards a very extensive class of phenomena. The subjective method denies us this'mode of research. Again, the very peculiarity and singularity of thesubjective method led men to dissociate mind science from every other. The instrument of research was entirely intangible and phenomenal, and differed fundamentally from every other instrument of research, even from the senses. The subject of research?thought, feelings, desire, resolution, will?was entirely phenomenal and immaterial. It differed fundamentally from every other object of knowledge. It was the mind, the soul, making itself known through the consciousness, which was held to be co-extensive with the mind. This was the ego, the immaterial unity which constituted the essence of individuality and the substratum of the primary fact or feeling of personal identity. Thus mind science was cultivated on an entirely separate and distinct basis from every other science, and by an entirely separate and distinct method, namely introspection or reflection. From this two consequences resulted. All the experiences or revelations of consciousness were held to be properties or inward manifestations of "the mind/' These, though phenomenal, could be rendered still more phenomenal by the process of abstraction, and mind-science became mixed up with metaphysical speculation?theories regarding the intimate nature of things and the primary conditions of existence.
These might have been deduced from any phenomena of creation if the concrete facts of their manifestation had been sufficiently abstracted or generalized ; but the function of the instrument was mistaken for the material on which it wrought, and metaphysics, the result of abstraction, confounded with the process of abstraction. Another consequence was, that a spurious antagonism was set up between the material and immaterial, the logical result of which was to lead the more thorough going philosophers to deny the existence of the material altogether, or at any rate our power of knowing it, and to limit the contents of conscious knowledge entirely to ideas. This was the doctrine of the philosopher Berkeley, which when worked out to its logical issue by Hume, resulted in absolute scepticism. The best illustration of the tendency of a metaphysical psychology is furnished by the manner in which the attribute or phenomenon of mind has been limited exclusively to the revelations or experiences of human consciousness. All the qualities or attributes which we include in this term?design, purpose orderly pre-arrangement, adaptation to ends?are manifest throughout the created universe. There are evidences of mind everywhere. In the human being and in the human brain there are the purest and highest evidences of mind, and psychologists found in self-consciousness the most genuine and refined evidence of it.
Disregarding the proofs of mind that creation everywhere afforded, they limited the term to what they found in conciousness and denominated that " the mind." I shall not pursue farther the errors and disadvantages which the exclusive use of the subjective method of mental research gave rise to ; suffice it to say that consciousness though a most valuable, is a most imperfect instrument of discovery in mind-science. We now know that a very large number of mental actions take place unconsciously ; that actions which are consciously performed at one time, are unconsciously performed at others ; that consciousness is by no means a necessary condition of mental activity ; that it may reach any part of the body supplied with nerves, but ordinarily accompanies, or is associated with, a very small part of our mental or adaptive organization. While, therefore, we retain it as a valuable witness of mental energy, we look upon it as but one of a number of channels through which a knowledge of the phenomena of mental activity may be arrived at. The system of phrenology was practically a revolt against the too exclusive use of the subjective method, and is worthy of attention as the most pronounced attempt which has hitherto been made to establish a science of mind on the basis of the objective method of observation. The history of it belongs to the first half of this century. Philosophy was at the close of the eighteenth century represented by a number of schools the chief of which were the iaealists, of whom Berkeley and Hume were the most distinguished in Great Britain ; the Scotch school of common sense represented by Reid and Stewart; German metaphysicians, the most prominent of whom were Kant and Fichte ; the sensual school, the main exponents of which were Locke, Condillac, Helvetius, D'Holbach and Cabanis ; and the materialists, among whom Hartley, Priestley, and Darwin were the most conspicuous.
The founder of the doctrine of phrenology was Franz Joseph Gall, who was born at Tiefenbrunn in Swabia, in 1757. He is said to have, while still a school boy, commenced to observe those correspondences between character and cranial configuration, to which he devoted his life with remarkable enthusiasm and great tenacity of purpose. As a student of medicine at Vienna, he diligently rode his hobby, and lost no opportunity of examining the heads of persons exhibiting any remarkable or prominent endowment of mind 01* disposition, and noting the result. He studied the characters and heads of his school-fellows and fellow-students, in-terviewed remarkable poets, painters, mechanics, musicians. He visited the lunatic asylum at Vienna, and eagerly took stock of the individual peculiarities, mental and cranial, of its inmates ; haunted prisons and courts of justice for the same purpose, and when he obtained his diploma, he took every opportunity of dissecting the brains and examining the skulls of persons whom he had made the subjects of his observation during life. Nay further,he extended the range of hisenquiries to the lower animals ; he noticed that they also were characterised by prominent and peculiar dispositions, faculties, and instincts, and that these were capable of comparison with similar human proclivities. He investigated their skulls and brains also, and endeavoured to discover and define the cranial or cerebral peculiarities which co-existed with psychical singularities. So far, three things are worthy of special remark in Gall's career. He was a monoideist, and an enthusiastic monoideist.
He seems early in life to have got a notion into his head, and to have worked at it with industry and persistence? devoted to it all the power of a keen intellect, and all the diligence of a busy life time crowded with opportunities. It is men of this kind who set their mark on the page of history, whether the subject of their concentrated attention be religion, politics or science. In the second place, Gall's method was entirely empirical. He had no principle, no hypothesis. He was no doubt guided and governed by the belief that external indications of inward dispositions did exist, but did not at first concern himself with explanations. He registered the two classes of phenomena, noted correspondences, observed, enquired and recorded, and it was not until he had accumulated an immense series of facts that he began to theorise and systematise. The third feature of his early work is, that he sought for extreme instances, exceptional cases?great virtues or vices, strongly prominent qualities of mind or character, sharply defined specialities of disposition, rare gifts, and striking aptitudes. He aimed in this way to analyse the mind through the exaltation in different persons and animals of different faculties or proclivities, rather than by a study of his own mind, and arranging his conscious experiences into a severely logical array of properties and powers, as every one of his predecessors in the field of psychology had done.
After tweenty years of observation Gall in 1796 delivered his first course of lectures in Vienna.
These excited immense interest, and the newfangled doctrines expounded in them were treated withlittle courtesy or leniency. IniSooGall was joined by Spurzheim, another medical man who warmly espoused his views and contributed very materially to systematise, extend and popularise them. The two set out on a tour of lecturing through Germany and Switzerland. They reached Paris in 1807 and gained many adherents, but at the same time aroused much opposition. In 1813 Spurzheim proceeded to England and lectured in the principal towns, making many converts and exciting great interest whereverhewent.
Gall remained in Paris lecturing and publishing-He died in the year 1828. His labours are embodied in a memoire on the Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System in general and of the brain in particalar, presented to the Paris Institute in 1808, and in a work of six volumes entitled " Fonctions du Cerveau," published in Paris in 1823. In the preparation of these books Gall derived important assistance from Spurzheim. They quarrelled in 1813 regarding the share of labour and credit each was entitled to in the elaboration of the new doctrine. The truth of the matter appears to be that Gall was the originator and projector of the system, and that Spurzheim systematized, elaborated, and popularised it. Spurzheim was a man of more philosophical mind than Gall, and possessed the advantage of a pleasing address, taking manners, and great fluency in lecturing. He made many disciples in Britain, more particularly in Edinburgh, whereaschool of phrenology was organized, the ablest and most enthusiastic of whom were George Combe and Sidney Smith, both of whom published important works on the subject. You will find in " The Principles of Phrenology" published by Sidney Smith in 1838 a very complete and interesting account of the principles-and details of the system. About this time phrenology was in the zenith of its success.
It cannot be said ever to have established itself as a science. A commission of the Paris Institute condemned it in 1810, and the British Association for the advancement of science refused to recognise it as a branch of science, and accord it a section. Since 1840 the doctrine has gradually fallen into discredit, and though espoused and supported by many able and earnest men, it may now be pronounced to be defunct as a special department of human knowledge. I shall now proceed to give a brief account of its tenets, and endeavour to show how much of the doctrine has secured a permanent place in science, and how much has been found wanting when weighed in the balance of observation and criticisim. The fundamental principle of phrenology is, that brain is the organ of mind , that mental energies depend upon cerebral changes or activities just as motion depends upon muscular contraction ; that in fact, perception, thought, will, emotion, &c., are the function of the central organ of the nervous system.
Gall took care to guard himself from a charge of materialism by leaving the question of the separate existence, unity or immateriality of the soul entirely open. He did not pretend to explain what the connection between brain and mind was. All he postulated was that the connection was an intimate and necessary one as living beings are constituted. The laws of brain action and function might therefore be studied in relation to the laws of life, nay brain or nervous life was scientifically but a phase of general body life. Phrenology, tiie science of mind, was therefore a department of bioiogy, tiie science of life. He thus established tor tne purposes of investigation a community ot ail organised 01* living beings, and brought within the scope of his enquiry all animated nature. This was the second step. The third consisted 111 defining a plurality of brain functions which, according to his fundamental principles,demanded a plurality of organs. He thought he detected in men and animals a multitude of distinct mental faculties which were essentially primary or innate. Other philosophers had laid down the existence of innate ideas independent of experience. These were mostly of the metaphysical kind, perceptions of mathematical and arithmetical truth, of personal identity, of sundry logical canons and notions of right and wrong. Gall's primary faculties were of a different sort. They consisted of instinctive tendencies which man possessed in common with animals, or emotional or intellectual attributes which were peculiar to him. These were laws of the organized nature of men and animals, peculiarities of the organization of the nervous system. The proofs which were advanced in support of the doctrine of the plurality of faculties was somewhat as follows. The body elsewhere exhibits a plurality of individual organs associated in the performance of one function, such as movement or digestion, and why not the brain. Different individuals exhibit different propensities, and mental endowments in different degrees of vigour. There must therefore be some essential distinction between them. In mental derangements some faculties or functions are deranged while others are sound. In sleep the phenomena of dreaming show that some portion or portions of the brain may be in action while others are in a state of inaction. Some of the lower animals exhibit certain propensities and instincts in striking energy, while others are feeble or dormant. His next step was to assert that the brain possessed a plurality of organs corresponding to these manifold functions. He placed these organs on the surface of the brain, and finding that the skull which covers the brain fits closely upon its surface, he reasoned that organs specially developed and active must, in accordance with the general laws of life, be specially large, and that their excessive size must be indicated by a special prominence or bump on the surface of the skull. To determine where the several organs were situated, he relied on observation. He examined the heads of men and animals for that purpose, and noticing what portion of the outer surface was specially prominent in individuals manifesting specially predominant functions, he carefully mapped out the exterior of the head accordingly. His system of localization of organs and faculties was extended and modified by subsequent observers. Such was the system of phrenology. It was an ambitious attempt to reduce mentil science to a code of exact propositions capable of being applied as an art to the affairs of every-day life. The more sanguine of its advocates claimed for it great capabilities of practical application in the administration of justice, in the education of children, in the selection of persons for employment, and in every sphere or circumstance where a knowledge of character is desirable. Even in the delicate matter of selecting a wife, phrenology or rather cranioscopy might be of inestimable advantage. These sanguine expectations are amusingly made fun of in one of Captain Marryatt's clever novels, in which he represents an aged dotard as endeavouring to mould and improve his mind and disposition by the use of a machine designed to raise bumps in one place and depress them in others by the use of suckers and pads applied according as the propensity which he desired to devolope or suppress was desirable or otherwise. This ingenious experimentalist was strangled in his own machine.
Phrenology, as I have already told you, has lapsed into discredit and oblivion. The objections urged against it were fatal, and the progress of research has weakened rather than strengthened it. The skull was found in many respects to be by no means a perfect indication of the shape and size of the so-called organs within.
Much of the surface of the brain, which is in no way distinguishable from the rest, and has as much right to be accorded special functions, has no skull to cover it. Other portions on the side and base have skull, but so arranged that it cannot be examined from without. The empirical correspondence between organs and faculties laid down by Gall and his followers was found not to hold good in conspicuous instances. Thus, persons with marvellous arithmetical gifts were found to be deficient in the organ of number, and so on.
These and other objections were fatal to the system, but it has left its impression on science, and much of it contained germs of truth which have since fructified. What these germs are and how they have fructified I shall now proceed to show.
In the first place, in laying down that the brain is the organ of mind, and that it must be studied as a living organ manifesting general and special attributes of life, phrenology placed the objective method of observation in its proper position and brought psychology within the fold of physical science. The subjective method takes its attitude as an auxiliary in place of being the sole and exclusive instrument of research. The fault of phrenology in this connection was that it was too limited. The brain is not the whole organ of mind, and far less that part of it which has a closely fitting skull-covering. " The mind" pervades the whole nervous system, and any portion of it may attest its existence in consciousness. I would go even further, and assert that the man is the true unity, that the whole organism is necessary to the complete conception of an individual living a life of exquisite adaptation to its surroundings, and that error or defect of any part of that organism impairs or abolishes the adaptation. Injury or disease of the brain we know affects mental soundness and health, but the brain may be quite sound and the mind may still be clouded, disturbed or obliterated by injury or disease elsewhere. And it is this consideration which gives truth and weight to the fact that in the study of the human mind the laws of life must be placed above the laws of mind, as these constitute necessary and paramount conditions of their manifestation. Nor can it be denied that mental faculties are manifold, and that we are born with inherent capacities of mind which we inherit from our parents, and which vary in different individuals and sexes, and are to a great extent independent of circumstances,?education, development or repression. The phrenological classification of the mental faculties is superior to the metaphysical in several respects. It recognisesthe existence of animal instincts and propensities as well as of intellectual gifts and attributes. It also recognises the fact that we are organised and live in adaptation to certain circumstances, and that our minds are admirably ordained to subserve the purpose of adapted relations. The true nature of a nervous system and of mental manifestation is thus indicated as a beautiful and complex organ of relation, as a regulator and harmoniser of all the manifold par:s which enter into our construction,and of the infinite variety of conditions outside of us to which we must adapt ourselves. The phrenological classification excelled all that had preceded it in taking the outer world into account, and the inherent and inherited capacities by which the proper relation and adaptation of man to the outer world are accomplished.
The doctrine that man is endowed with a plurality of faculties?a plurality exactly measured by the plurality of the relations and conditions of his existence, is therefore a sound and true one, but have these faculties their special seats? Have they special portions of the nervous system assigned to them, or is the January i, 1883.] THE INDIAN MEDICAL GAZETTE. nervous system as a whole a single organ of adaptation, and is the variety of adaptabilities due to the variety of conditions under which the single organ acts ? As the electric telegraph can be made the instrument of conveying communications of infinitely varied character, so does not the nervous telegraph constitute the single instrument of infinitely varied experiences and energies. The phrenological scheme gives a separate existence and organ to every faculty, but consciousness tells us that we are at any moment capable of only one species of mental effort, and that every power of the mind? propensity, instinct, emotion, and intellect?may be implicated and concentrated in that effort. It is further to be remarked that the nervous system varies in its retentiveness of mental operations. Some, such for instance as subserve the necessary ends of the continuance of the individual or species, are innate, instinctive, stereotyped as it were, independent of experience, use, or will?subject however to variations in strength and to control. Others are more constant but less inevitable elements of our mental life ; but how many of the higher intellectual operations are evanescent ?
Every man experiences that an immense number of his mental operations pass away beyond recollection or revival. These features of our subjective experience would justify the belief that there are separate portions of our nervous organization in which the more permanent and the more evanescent of our mental functions have an organic seat, but I believe the real solution of the question is, that particular portions of the system are devoted to particular descriptions of mental energy, and not to particular purposes of our adapted life, and it is further apparent from recent researches that the more organic mental energies are situated lower down on the nervous system, the more intellectual and abstract higher up. The investigations of Fritsch, Hitzig, and Ferrier on the brains of dogs, monkeys, and men, go to show that the more intellectual operations have their seat in the frontal lobes, the will and adapted movements in the parietal lobes, and the senses and sensations of organic life in the back and base of the brain, while the ganglia and spinal cord are devoted to the control of muscular movements, respiration, circulation, nutrition, and animal life generally.
The scheme of organs and faculties devised by phrenologists has thus been proved to be visionary, but many of the principles of the system have stood the test of time and further investigation.
It may be contended that the doctrines which I have been advocating are materialistic, that the view of man and his nervous system which I have illustrated reduces the human being to a mere mechanism, and that, if the brain is capable of subserving all the purposes hitherto attributed to "the mind," "the mind" or the immaterial principle becomes unnecessary. Far be it from me to lay down any such views. We must for purposes of science accept phenomena as we find them, and if these are accurately and correctly observed, we must admit their truth, but we have no right to travel beyond the phenomena and frame rigid conclusions, positive or negative, regarding matters which lie beyond the range of scientific investigation.
Even in the most gross and ordinary matters of physical research there are questions which underlie our obseration and laws regarding which we must confess ourselves ignorant and unable to solve them. No incident of nature' is more universal or tangible than the phenomenon of gravitation, yet if you ask me what is the nature of the force of gravitation, or why bodies are thus mutually attracted, I cannot tell you. So in mental phenomena we find problems which have hitherto eluded all our powers of research and speculation. Some of these will be cleared up as knowledge advances. But while we are justified in holding by what we do know, it would be presumptuous and foolish to dogmatise regarding that of which we are scientifically in ingorance.
